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Full Idea
If propositions are abstract entities, more like the objects of mathematics, it seems mysterious that states of mind should depend for their causal powers upon the propositions which allegedly constitute their 'contents'.
Gist of Idea
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], 70)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.70
A Reaction
Compare standard objections to Platonic Forms (e.g. Idea 3353). You can't believe in abstract propositions, but be a reductive physicalist about the mind. So propositions are dynamic brain structures. Easy.
Related Idea
Idea 3353 If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
| 6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
| 6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
| 21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
| 21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
| 9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
| 9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| 12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |