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Single Idea 6635
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
]
Full Idea
The causal theory of beliefs seems condemned to treat all beliefs as true, which is absurd, …and we do not want to say that tomorrow's rain 'causes' today's belief that it will rain tomorrow.
Clarification
The 'causal theory' says beliefs are simply caused by the external world
Gist of Idea
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.92
A Reaction
This is aimed at Fodor. A false belief might be caused by reality if one had one's internal wires crossed, and a belief about the future might be caused by events happening now. This theory is not dead.
The
45 ideas
from 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'
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6617
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The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties?
[Lowe]
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6631
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If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?
[Lowe]
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6618
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A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change
[Lowe]
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6619
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Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining'
[Lowe]
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6626
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'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires
[Lowe]
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6625
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If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
[Lowe]
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6623
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Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
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6628
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Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
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6621
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You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief
[Lowe]
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6629
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Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
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6622
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Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
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6630
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Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
[Lowe]
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6634
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Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)
[Lowe]
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6636
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The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
[Lowe]
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6633
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Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical
[Lowe]
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6632
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The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief
[Lowe]
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6635
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Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future
[Lowe]
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6637
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How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially?
[Lowe]
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6642
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Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations
[Lowe]
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6641
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Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity
[Lowe]
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6643
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'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality
[Lowe]
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6638
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One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form
[Lowe]
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6644
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Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information
[Lowe]
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6639
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The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common
[Lowe]
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6640
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A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external
[Lowe]
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6645
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If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong
[Lowe]
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6646
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The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight
[Lowe]
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6647
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Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation
[Lowe]
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6648
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Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech
[Lowe]
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6651
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People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event
[Lowe]
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6652
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'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background
[Lowe]
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6655
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The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge
[Lowe]
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6653
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Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth
[Lowe]
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6656
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The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods
[Lowe]
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6654
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A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual
[Lowe]
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6659
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The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent
[Lowe]
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6661
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Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation
[Lowe]
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6662
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We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice
[Lowe]
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6663
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People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes
[Lowe]
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6657
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Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity
[Lowe]
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6665
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Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge
[Lowe]
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6670
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If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body
[Lowe]
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6671
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It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation
[Lowe]
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6666
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All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I'
[Lowe]
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6667
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There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory
[Lowe]
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