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Single Idea 6639

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems ]

Full Idea

The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says that we have either veridical perception or else hallucination, but there is no common element in the form of a 'perceptual experience' which would be present in either case and merely caused in different ways.

Clarification

'Veridical' means true; 'disjunctive' means either/or

Gist of Idea

The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.145


A Reaction

McDowell is associated with this view. It seems to be another attempt to get rid of sense-data. It seems odd, though, to say that a hallucination of a dagger has nothing in common at all with experience of real daggers. Why did hallucinations evolve?


The 19 ideas with the same theme [difficulties with the concept of sense-data]:

We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]
Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell]
Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell]
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
Part of what we mean by stating the facts is the way we tend to experience them [Wittgenstein]
As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H]
We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine]
Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
We experience qualities as of objects, not on their own [Harré/Madden]
The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M]
Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H]
If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane]
The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane]
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
Sense-data are only safe from scepticism if they are primitive and unconceptualised [O'Grady]