more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 6640

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception ]

Full Idea

A causal theorist can be a 'direct realist' in the sense that he can hold that the only objects of perception are external objects.

Gist of Idea

A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.147

A Reaction

There still seem to be problems with perceiving reflections, or very distant objects (the time-lag problem), or perceiving 'secondary' qualities.

The 45 ideas from 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'

6617 The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
6631 If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
6618 A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
6619 Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
6626 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
6625 If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
6623 Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
6628 Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
6621 You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
6629 Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
6622 Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
6630 Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
6634 Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
6636 The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
6633 Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
6632 The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
6635 Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
6637 How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
6642 Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
6641 Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
6643 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
6638 One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
6644 Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
6639 The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
6640 A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
6645 If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
6646 The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
6647 Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
6648 Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
6651 People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
6652 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
6655 The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
6653 Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
6656 The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
6654 A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
6659 The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
6661 Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
6662 We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
6663 People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
6657 Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
6665 Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
6670 If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
6671 It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
6666 All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
6667 There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]