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Single Idea 6643

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism ]

Full Idea

The 'ecological' approach to perception resists the idea that our brains have to construct information about our environment by inference from sensations, because the information is already present in the environment, available to well-tuned senses.

Gist of Idea

'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.153


A Reaction

The psychologist J.J.Gibson is the source of this view. This pushes us towards direct realism, and away from representative theories, which are based too much on problems arising from illusions (which are freak cases). Interesting.


The 16 ideas with the same theme [we are in direct contact with reality]:

A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas]
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid]
It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche]
I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell]
'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell]
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson]
There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati]
Direct realism is false, because defeasibility questions are essential to perceptual knowledge [Galloway]