more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 6643

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism ]

Full Idea

The 'ecological' approach to perception resists the idea that our brains have to construct information about our environment by inference from sensations, because the information is already present in the environment, available to well-tuned senses.

Gist of Idea

'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.153

A Reaction

The psychologist J.J.Gibson is the source of this view. This pushes us towards direct realism, and away from representative theories, which are based too much on problems arising from illusions (which are freak cases). Interesting.

The 45 ideas from 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'

6617 The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
6631 If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
6618 A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
6619 Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
6626 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
6625 If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
6623 Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
6628 Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
6621 You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
6629 Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
6622 Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
6630 Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
6634 Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
6636 The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
6633 Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
6632 The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
6635 Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
6637 How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
6642 Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
6641 Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
6643 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
6638 One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
6644 Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
6639 The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
6640 A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
6645 If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
6646 The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
6647 Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
6648 Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
6651 People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
6652 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
6655 The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
6653 Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
6656 The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
6654 A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
6659 The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
6661 Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
6662 We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
6663 People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
6657 Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
6665 Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
6670 If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
6671 It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
6666 All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
6667 There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]