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Single Idea 6644
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
]
Full Idea
Computational psychologists object to the 'ecological' approach to perception (with its externalist, direct realist picture), because it leaves us entirely in the dark as to how our senses 'pick up' information about the environment.
Gist of Idea
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 6)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.154
A Reaction
I find myself siding with the computationalists, but then I have always favoured the representational view of perception among philosophers. Lowe comments that both approaches neglect actual experience. We construct models, e.g. of London.
The
45 ideas
from 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'
6617
|
The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties?
[Lowe]
|
6631
|
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?
[Lowe]
|
6618
|
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change
[Lowe]
|
6619
|
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining'
[Lowe]
|
6626
|
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires
[Lowe]
|
6625
|
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
[Lowe]
|
6621
|
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief
[Lowe]
|
6623
|
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
|
6628
|
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
|
6629
|
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
|
6622
|
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
|
6630
|
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
[Lowe]
|
6634
|
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)
[Lowe]
|
6636
|
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
[Lowe]
|
6633
|
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical
[Lowe]
|
6632
|
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief
[Lowe]
|
6635
|
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future
[Lowe]
|
6637
|
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially?
[Lowe]
|
6642
|
Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations
[Lowe]
|
6641
|
Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity
[Lowe]
|
6639
|
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common
[Lowe]
|
6640
|
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external
[Lowe]
|
6645
|
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong
[Lowe]
|
6646
|
The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight
[Lowe]
|
6643
|
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality
[Lowe]
|
6638
|
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form
[Lowe]
|
6644
|
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information
[Lowe]
|
6647
|
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation
[Lowe]
|
6648
|
Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech
[Lowe]
|
6651
|
People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event
[Lowe]
|
6652
|
'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background
[Lowe]
|
6655
|
The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge
[Lowe]
|
6654
|
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual
[Lowe]
|
6653
|
Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth
[Lowe]
|
6656
|
The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods
[Lowe]
|
6659
|
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent
[Lowe]
|
6661
|
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation
[Lowe]
|
6662
|
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice
[Lowe]
|
6663
|
People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes
[Lowe]
|
6657
|
Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity
[Lowe]
|
6667
|
There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory
[Lowe]
|
6665
|
Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge
[Lowe]
|
6670
|
If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body
[Lowe]
|
6671
|
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation
[Lowe]
|
6666
|
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I'
[Lowe]
|