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Single Idea 6654

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room ]

Full Idea

A computer executing its program is not equivalent to the English-speaker in the Chinese Room, but to the combination of the English-speaker and the operation manual.

Gist of Idea

A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual

Source

E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.216


A Reaction

Searle replies that there would be no understanding even if the person learned the manual off by heart. However, if we ask 'Is there any understanding of the universe in Newton's book?' the answer has to be 'yes'. So the manual contains understanding.


The 11 ideas with the same theme [counterexample of non-conscious function]:

Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey]
Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey]
Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers]
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
The Chinese Room should be able to ask itself questions in Mandarin [Westaway]