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Single Idea 6661
[filed under theme 20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
]
Full Idea
Libet's experiments (on conscious and non-conscious choice) seem to provide empirical support for the concept of 'volition', conceived as a special kind of 'executive' mental operation.
Gist of Idea
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation
Source
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9)
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.254
A Reaction
Despite the strictures of Hobbes (Idea 2362) and Williams (Idea 2171), the will strikes me as a genuine item, clearly observable by introspection, and offering the best explanation of human behaviour. I take it to be part of the brain's frontal lobes.
Related Ideas
Idea 2362
The will is just the last appetite before action [Hobbes]
Idea 2171
The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
The
45 ideas
from 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'
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6617
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The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties?
[Lowe]
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6631
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If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?
[Lowe]
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6618
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A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change
[Lowe]
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6619
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Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining'
[Lowe]
|
|
6626
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'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires
[Lowe]
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6625
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If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
[Lowe]
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6623
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Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
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6628
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Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
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6621
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You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief
[Lowe]
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6629
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Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
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6622
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Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
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6630
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Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
[Lowe]
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6634
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Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)
[Lowe]
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6636
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The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
[Lowe]
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6633
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Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical
[Lowe]
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6632
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The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief
[Lowe]
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6635
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Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future
[Lowe]
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6637
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How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially?
[Lowe]
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6642
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Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations
[Lowe]
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6641
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Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity
[Lowe]
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6643
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'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality
[Lowe]
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6638
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One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form
[Lowe]
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6644
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Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information
[Lowe]
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6639
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The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common
[Lowe]
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6640
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A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external
[Lowe]
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6645
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If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong
[Lowe]
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6646
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The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight
[Lowe]
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6647
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Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation
[Lowe]
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6648
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Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech
[Lowe]
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6651
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People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event
[Lowe]
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6652
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'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background
[Lowe]
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6655
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The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge
[Lowe]
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6653
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Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth
[Lowe]
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6656
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The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods
[Lowe]
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6654
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A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual
[Lowe]
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6659
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The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent
[Lowe]
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6661
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Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation
[Lowe]
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6662
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We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice
[Lowe]
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6663
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People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes
[Lowe]
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6657
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Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity
[Lowe]
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6665
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Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge
[Lowe]
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6670
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If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body
[Lowe]
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6671
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It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation
[Lowe]
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6666
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All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I'
[Lowe]
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6667
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There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory
[Lowe]
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