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Full Idea
It can be argued (by Davidson) that far from it being the case that reasons for and causes of action are quite distinct, reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons.
Gist of Idea
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.259
A Reaction
Lowe argues against this view. The rival views to Davidson would be either that reasons are no more than desires-plus-beliefs in disguise, or that the will causes actions, and strong reasons carry a great weight with the will. I like the will.
| 20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
| 23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
| 20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
| 3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |