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Single Idea 6672
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
]
Full Idea
Moore's Paradox says it makes no sense to assert 'I believe that p, but p is false', even though it makes perfectly good sense to assert 'I used to believe p, but p is false' or 'You believe p, but p is false'.
Gist of Idea
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false'
Source
report of G.E. Moore (works [1905]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.10
Book Ref
Lowe,E.J.: 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' [CUP 2000], p.292
A Reaction
I'm not sure if this really deserves the label of 'paradox'. I take it as drawing attention to the obvious fact that belief is commitment to truth. I think my assessment that p is true is correct, but your assessment is wrong. ('True' is not redundant!)
The
23 ideas
from G.E. Moore
21342
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A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related
[Moore,GE, by Heil]
|
17992
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The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe.
[Moore,GE]
|
7527
|
Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language
[Moore,GE, by Monk]
|
6405
|
Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism
[Moore,GE, by Grayling]
|
22302
|
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts
[Moore,GE, by Potter]
|
7526
|
Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down
[Moore,GE, by Monk]
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22151
|
The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction
[Boulter on Moore,GE]
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8033
|
Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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8032
|
Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch?
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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11050
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Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent
[Hanna on Moore,GE]
|
23726
|
Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism
[Moore,GE, by Smith,M]
|
5925
|
The three main values are good, right and beauty
[Moore,GE, by Ross]
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8039
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Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is
[MacIntyre on Moore,GE]
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5902
|
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good
[Moore,GE, by Ross]
|
5907
|
Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them
[Ross on Moore,GE]
|
11057
|
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
[Moore,GE]
|
11056
|
The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
[Moore,GE]
|
5903
|
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
[Moore,GE]
|
18676
|
We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
[Moore,GE]
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21233
|
The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire
[Moore,GE]
|
6349
|
I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand'
[Moore,GE]
|
20147
|
Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger
[Moore,GE]
|
6672
|
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false'
[Moore,GE, by Lowe]
|