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Single Idea 6718

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions ]

Full Idea

So long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken.

Gist of Idea

I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought

Source

George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §22)

Book Ref

Berkeley,George: 'The Principles of Human Knowledge etc.', ed/tr. Warnock,G.J. [Fontana 1962], p.61

A Reaction

I think it was one of the great errors of twentieth century philosophy to say that Berkeley cannot do this, because thought needs language. Personally I think language lags along behind most our thinking, tidying up the mess. I believe in propositions.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [propositions as features of thought]:

13763 Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
23404 Words are for meaning, and once you have that you can forget the words [Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)]
6024 Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]
23322 Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false [Stoic school, by Frede,M]
9105 Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
6718 I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
6435 You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
22307 Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell]
23490 A thought is mental constituents that relate to reality as words do [Wittgenstein]
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
9084 Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
15154 We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
6632 The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
9133 Propositions are what settle problems of ambiguity in sentences [Sorensen]
8484 If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
22250 There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
16298 We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach]