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Single Idea 6718

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions ]

Full Idea

So long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken.

Gist of Idea

I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought

Source

George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §22)

Book Ref

Berkeley,George: 'The Principles of Human Knowledge etc.', ed/tr. Warnock,G.J. [Fontana 1962], p.61

A Reaction

I think it was one of the great errors of twentieth century philosophy to say that Berkeley cannot do this, because thought needs language. Personally I think language lags along behind most our thinking, tidying up the mess. I believe in propositions.

The 33 ideas from 'The Principles of Human Knowledge'

18876 Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
6495 Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
23636 Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley]
6491 Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
6720 Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
6721 Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley]
6723 The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
6722 Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
6724 The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
6726 No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
6728 Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
6727 Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
6729 Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
6730 We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
6731 No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
6732 When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
6733 I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley]
6714 Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
6711 The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley]
22309 An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
6734 If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
6735 All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley]
6736 I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
6737 Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]
10581 I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
15861 The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
6713 If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
6715 Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
6716 Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
6717 Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
6718 I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
6719 No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
16636 A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]