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Single Idea 6719

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals ]

Full Idea

He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name.

Gist of Idea

No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas

Source

George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §24)

Book Ref

Berkeley,George: 'The Principles of Human Knowledge etc.', ed/tr. Warnock,G.J. [Fontana 1962], p.62

A Reaction

A nice point against universals. Maybe gods only think in particulars. One particular on its own could never suggest a universal. How are you going to spot patterns if you don't think in universals? Maths needs patterns.

Related Idea

The 16 ideas with the same theme [denial of the real existence of universals]:

5869 The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
10396 If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
10395 Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
9103 A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham]
15388 Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
17247 The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes]
7717 All things that exist are particulars [Locke]
7718 Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke]
6715 Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
6719 No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
23650 Only individuals exist [Reid]
9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
15402 There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
4232 Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]