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Single Idea 6735
[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
]
Full Idea
There cannot be any motion other than relative; …if there was one only body in being it could not possibly move.
Gist of Idea
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move
Source
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §112)
Book Ref
Berkeley,George: 'The Principles of Human Knowledge etc.', ed/tr. Warnock,G.J. [Fontana 1962], p.121
A Reaction
This seems to agree with with Leibniz in denying the Newton-Clarke idea of absolute space. See Idea 2100. Suppose there were two bodies racing towards one another, when one of them suddenly vanished?
Related Idea
Idea 2100
Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
The
69 ideas
from George Berkeley
5192
|
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations
[Berkeley, by Ayer]
|
5174
|
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things
[Ayer on Berkeley]
|
1103
|
'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects
[Russell on Berkeley]
|
6403
|
For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's
[Berkeley, by Grayling]
|
5374
|
Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended
[Russell on Berkeley]
|
3930
|
There is no such thing as 'material substance'
[Berkeley]
|
3931
|
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities
[Berkeley]
|
3932
|
A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water
[Berkeley]
|
3933
|
Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities
[Berkeley]
|
3934
|
A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny
[Berkeley]
|
3935
|
The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object
[Berkeley]
|
3936
|
Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds
[Berkeley]
|
3937
|
'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses
[Berkeley]
|
3938
|
Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual
[Berkeley]
|
3939
|
I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind
[Berkeley]
|
3940
|
Distance is not directly perceived by sight
[Berkeley]
|
3950
|
There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him
[Berkeley]
|
3949
|
It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness
[Berkeley]
|
3941
|
How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?
[Berkeley]
|
3942
|
I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it
[Berkeley]
|
3943
|
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception?
[Berkeley]
|
3944
|
It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed.
[Berkeley]
|
3945
|
There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it
[Berkeley]
|
3946
|
A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition
[Berkeley]
|
3947
|
Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind
[Berkeley]
|
3948
|
Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own
[Berkeley]
|
3951
|
There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent
[Berkeley]
|
3952
|
I know that nothing inconsistent can exist
[Berkeley]
|
3953
|
Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter
[Berkeley]
|
3955
|
If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events
[Berkeley]
|
3954
|
Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law
[Berkeley]
|
3956
|
People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God
[Berkeley]
|
3957
|
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves
[Berkeley]
|
3958
|
Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies
[Berkeley]
|
3959
|
There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit
[Berkeley]
|
18876
|
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are
[Berkeley, by Cameron]
|
6495
|
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism
[Robinson,H on Berkeley]
|
23636
|
Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds
[Reid on Berkeley]
|
6491
|
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought
[Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
|
6720
|
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations
[Berkeley]
|
6721
|
Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self
[Berkeley]
|
6723
|
The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds
[Berkeley]
|
6722
|
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
[Berkeley]
|
6724
|
The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives
[Berkeley]
|
6726
|
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities
[Berkeley]
|
6728
|
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion
[Berkeley]
|
6727
|
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold
[Berkeley]
|
6729
|
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties
[Berkeley]
|
6730
|
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections
[Berkeley]
|
6731
|
No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy
[Berkeley]
|
6732
|
When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind
[Berkeley]
|
6733
|
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind
[Berkeley]
|
6714
|
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
[Berkeley]
|
6711
|
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects
[Berkeley]
|
22309
|
An idea can only be like another idea
[Berkeley]
|
6734
|
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature
[Berkeley]
|
6735
|
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move
[Berkeley]
|
6736
|
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects
[Berkeley]
|
6737
|
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings
[Berkeley]
|
10581
|
I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas
[Berkeley]
|
15861
|
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience
[Berkeley]
|
6713
|
If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason
[Berkeley]
|
6715
|
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
[Berkeley]
|
6716
|
Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas
[Berkeley]
|
6717
|
Abstract ideas are impossible
[Berkeley]
|
6718
|
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
[Berkeley]
|
6719
|
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
[Berkeley]
|
16636
|
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
[Berkeley]
|
18091
|
Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities
[Berkeley]
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