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Single Idea 6739

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem ]

Full Idea

If someone were to observe beech trees every day over one summer they would have evidence that seems to support both the hypothesis that beech trees are deciduous and the hypothesis that they are evergreens.

Gist of Idea

Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses

Source

Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Intro)

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.20

A Reaction

Bird offers this to anyone who (like me) is tempted to dismiss the 'grue' problem as ridiculous. Obviously he is right; 'deciduous' works like 'grue'. But we invented the predicate 'deciduous' to match an observed property.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [problem of a predicate which changes over time]:

17646 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
18749 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
17655 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
16933 Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine]
17675 Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
17683 Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
5485 Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis]
15887 'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
15888 The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
15096 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
8556 Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
9652 To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis]
4783 Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
3760 Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
14989 Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
14997 Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
6738 Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird]
6739 Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird]
6799 We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird]
7296 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]