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Single Idea 6748
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
]
Full Idea
There may be a regularity of siblings looking similar, but the tie that binds them is not their similarity, but rather their being born of the same parents.
Clarification
'Siblings' are brothers and sisters
Gist of Idea
Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them
Source
Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.49
A Reaction
A nice objection to the regularity view. Regularities, as so often in philosophy (e.g. Idea 1364), may be the evidence or test for a law, rather than the law itself, which requires causal mechanisms, ultimately based (I think) in essences.
Related Idea
Idea 1364
Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke]
The
61 ideas
from 'Philosophy of Science'
6805
|
Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity
[Bird]
|
6807
|
In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy
[Bird]
|
6738
|
Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates
[Bird]
|
6739
|
Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses
[Bird]
|
6746
|
There may be many laws, each with only a few instances
[Bird]
|
6740
|
'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not
[Bird]
|
6741
|
There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental
[Bird]
|
6742
|
A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily
[Bird]
|
6743
|
If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily
[Bird]
|
6744
|
Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay?
[Bird]
|
6747
|
Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself
[Bird]
|
6748
|
Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them
[Bird]
|
6749
|
We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together
[Bird]
|
6745
|
A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong
[Bird]
|
6753
|
Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes
[Bird]
|
6762
|
Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations
[Bird]
|
6763
|
Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working
[Bird]
|
6754
|
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things
[Bird]
|
6761
|
Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another
[Bird]
|
6757
|
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event
[Bird]
|
6752
|
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation
[Bird]
|
6750
|
Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional
[Bird]
|
6758
|
'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found
[Bird]
|
6759
|
Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts
[Bird]
|
6756
|
Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely
[Bird]
|
6760
|
An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death
[Bird]
|
6751
|
Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science
[Bird]
|
6767
|
Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours
[Bird]
|
6768
|
Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope
[Bird]
|
6770
|
Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation
[Bird]
|
6771
|
Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another
[Bird]
|
6776
|
Natural kinds are those that we use in induction
[Bird]
|
6769
|
In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6774
|
Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6764
|
Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name
[Bird]
|
6766
|
Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition
[Bird]
|
6773
|
If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind
[Bird]
|
6775
|
Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law
[Bird]
|
6772
|
Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter
[Bird]
|
6779
|
Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition
[Bird]
|
6780
|
Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories
[Bird]
|
6778
|
Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant
[Bird]
|
6786
|
As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases
[Bird]
|
6777
|
Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena
[Bird]
|
6785
|
Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist
[Bird]
|
6788
|
Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world
[Bird]
|
6787
|
Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth
[Bird]
|
6790
|
Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that
[Bird]
|
6791
|
If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge
[Bird]
|
6792
|
If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start?
[Bird]
|
6789
|
If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification
[Bird]
|
6798
|
Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works
[Bird]
|
6796
|
Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening
[Bird]
|
6797
|
Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it
[Bird]
|
6799
|
We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6800
|
Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge
[Bird]
|
6804
|
There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing
[Bird]
|
6808
|
Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions
[Bird]
|
6802
|
With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity
[Bird]
|
6801
|
Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual
[Bird]
|
6803
|
If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities.
[Bird]
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