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Single Idea 6749
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
]
Full Idea
We cannot infer a regularity from its instances unless there is something stronger than the regularity itself binding the instances together.
Gist of Idea
We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together
Source
Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.1)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.49
A Reaction
Spells out the implication of the example in Idea 6748. The reply to this criticism would be that no account can possibly be given of the 'something stronger' than further regularities, at a lower level (e.g. in the physics).
Related Idea
Idea 6748
Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird]
The
98 ideas
from Alexander Bird
17526
|
The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition
[Bird]
|
17528
|
The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions
[Bird]
|
17527
|
Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early)
[Bird]
|
14540
|
Only real powers are fundamental
[Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
|
23713
|
Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers
[Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
|
9450
|
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress
[Bird]
|
9449
|
The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world
[Bird]
|
9507
|
Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences
[Bird]
|
9472
|
Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common
[Bird]
|
9473
|
Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals
[Bird]
|
9474
|
A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out
[Bird]
|
9475
|
A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break
[Bird]
|
9477
|
Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds
[Bird]
|
9482
|
If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity
[Bird]
|
9481
|
Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility
[Bird]
|
9479
|
Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities
[Bird]
|
9484
|
If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law
[Bird]
|
9486
|
Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular?
[Bird]
|
9487
|
We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B
[Bird]
|
9488
|
Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties
[Bird]
|
9489
|
Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions
[Bird]
|
9490
|
The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself
[Bird]
|
9491
|
Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence
[Bird]
|
9493
|
We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation
[Bird]
|
9494
|
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws
[Bird]
|
9495
|
If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it
[Bird]
|
9496
|
That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is
[Bird]
|
9492
|
Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them
[Bird]
|
9498
|
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration
[Bird]
|
9499
|
Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions
[Bird]
|
9501
|
If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects
[Bird]
|
9500
|
If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched
[Bird]
|
9502
|
There might be just one fundamental natural property
[Bird]
|
9503
|
To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate
[Bird]
|
9504
|
The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be
[Bird]
|
9505
|
Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote
[Bird]
|
9506
|
Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible
[Bird]
|
6807
|
In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy
[Bird]
|
6805
|
Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity
[Bird]
|
6738
|
Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates
[Bird]
|
6739
|
Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses
[Bird]
|
6746
|
There may be many laws, each with only a few instances
[Bird]
|
6740
|
'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not
[Bird]
|
6741
|
There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental
[Bird]
|
6742
|
A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily
[Bird]
|
6743
|
If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily
[Bird]
|
6744
|
Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay?
[Bird]
|
6747
|
Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself
[Bird]
|
6748
|
Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them
[Bird]
|
6749
|
We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together
[Bird]
|
6745
|
A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong
[Bird]
|
6753
|
Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes
[Bird]
|
6762
|
Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations
[Bird]
|
6763
|
Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working
[Bird]
|
6750
|
Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional
[Bird]
|
6758
|
'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found
[Bird]
|
6759
|
Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts
[Bird]
|
6756
|
Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely
[Bird]
|
6760
|
An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death
[Bird]
|
6757
|
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event
[Bird]
|
6752
|
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation
[Bird]
|
6751
|
Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science
[Bird]
|
6754
|
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things
[Bird]
|
6761
|
Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another
[Bird]
|
6775
|
Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law
[Bird]
|
6773
|
If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind
[Bird]
|
6767
|
Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours
[Bird]
|
6768
|
Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope
[Bird]
|
6770
|
Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation
[Bird]
|
6771
|
Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another
[Bird]
|
6776
|
Natural kinds are those that we use in induction
[Bird]
|
6769
|
In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6774
|
Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6764
|
Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name
[Bird]
|
6766
|
Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition
[Bird]
|
6772
|
Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter
[Bird]
|
6778
|
Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant
[Bird]
|
6785
|
Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist
[Bird]
|
6788
|
Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world
[Bird]
|
6787
|
Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth
[Bird]
|
6779
|
Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition
[Bird]
|
6780
|
Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories
[Bird]
|
6786
|
As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases
[Bird]
|
6777
|
Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena
[Bird]
|
6792
|
If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start?
[Bird]
|
6790
|
Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that
[Bird]
|
6791
|
If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge
[Bird]
|
6789
|
If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification
[Bird]
|
6798
|
Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works
[Bird]
|
6796
|
Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening
[Bird]
|
6797
|
Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it
[Bird]
|
6800
|
Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge
[Bird]
|
6799
|
We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6808
|
Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions
[Bird]
|
6801
|
Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual
[Bird]
|
6803
|
If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities.
[Bird]
|
6804
|
There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing
[Bird]
|
6802
|
With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity
[Bird]
|