more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 6753

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation ]

Full Idea

I think laws are fundamental and where there is a cause there is always a set of laws that encompasses the cause; identifying a cause will never be the final word in an scientific investigation, but will be open to supplementation by the underlying law.

Gist of Idea

Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes

Source

Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.65


A Reaction

I think this is wrong. I would say (from the essentialist angle) that essences have causes, and the laws are the regularities that are caused by the essences. If laws are the lowest level of explanation, why these laws and not others? God?


The 22 ideas with the same theme [causes as aspects of lawlike behaviour]:

Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement [Aristotle]
The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard]
We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares]
Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant]
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa]
Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]
The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley]
Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood]
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil]
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin]
Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford]
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird]
Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird]