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Single Idea 6754

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation ]

Full Idea

We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things.

Gist of Idea

We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things

Source

Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.66


A Reaction

An important point, and it is the job of philosophers to pull the two apart. How we talk does not necessarily show how it is. The concept of explanation is irrelevant in a universe containing no minds, or one containing only God. People seek the facts.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about the concept of explanation]:

Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable [Aristotle]
What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle]
Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle]
Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle]
Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions [Aristotle, by Politis]
All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer]
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben]
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
People tend to be satisfied with shallow explanations [Gelman]
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]