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Full Idea
Kripke's tiger example shows that a nominal essence is not necessary for the existence of a natural kind; examples from Putnam show that a nominal essence is not sufficient either.
Gist of Idea
Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.3
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.101
A Reaction
None of the characteristics of a tiger is essential to it. The appearance of water doesn't fix its reference. The move is towards an external view, that what matters for natural kinds is the real essence, not human conventions about it. I agree.
| 10398 | Natural kinds are not special; they are just well-defined resemblance collections [Abelard, by King,P] |
| 13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
| 16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
| 6765 | Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird] |
| 15299 | Species do not have enough constancy to be natural kinds [Harré/Madden] |
| 17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
| 17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
| 17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
| 17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
| 17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
| 17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
| 10351 | Natural kinds are social institutions [Kusch] |