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Single Idea 6773
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
]
Full Idea
The proposal is that if F is a universal appearing in some natural law, then Fs form a natural kind.
Gist of Idea
If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind
Source
Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.113
A Reaction
Such proposals always invite the question 'What is it about F that enables it to be a universal in a natural law?' Nothing can be ultimately defined simply by its role. The character (essence, even) of the thing makes the role possible.
The
98 ideas
from Alexander Bird
17526
|
The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition
[Bird]
|
17527
|
Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early)
[Bird]
|
17528
|
The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions
[Bird]
|
14540
|
Only real powers are fundamental
[Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
|
23713
|
Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers
[Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
|
9449
|
The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world
[Bird]
|
9450
|
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress
[Bird]
|
9507
|
Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences
[Bird]
|
9472
|
Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common
[Bird]
|
9473
|
Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals
[Bird]
|
9474
|
A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out
[Bird]
|
9475
|
A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break
[Bird]
|
9477
|
Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds
[Bird]
|
9482
|
If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity
[Bird]
|
9481
|
Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility
[Bird]
|
9479
|
Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities
[Bird]
|
9484
|
If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law
[Bird]
|
9486
|
Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular?
[Bird]
|
9487
|
We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B
[Bird]
|
9488
|
Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties
[Bird]
|
9489
|
Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions
[Bird]
|
9490
|
The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself
[Bird]
|
9491
|
Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence
[Bird]
|
9493
|
We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation
[Bird]
|
9494
|
Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws
[Bird]
|
9495
|
If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it
[Bird]
|
9496
|
That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is
[Bird]
|
9492
|
Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them
[Bird]
|
9498
|
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration
[Bird]
|
9499
|
Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions
[Bird]
|
9501
|
If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects
[Bird]
|
9500
|
If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched
[Bird]
|
9502
|
There might be just one fundamental natural property
[Bird]
|
9503
|
To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate
[Bird]
|
9504
|
The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be
[Bird]
|
9505
|
Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote
[Bird]
|
9506
|
Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible
[Bird]
|
6807
|
In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy
[Bird]
|
6805
|
Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity
[Bird]
|
6738
|
Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates
[Bird]
|
6739
|
Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses
[Bird]
|
6746
|
There may be many laws, each with only a few instances
[Bird]
|
6740
|
'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not
[Bird]
|
6741
|
There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental
[Bird]
|
6742
|
A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily
[Bird]
|
6743
|
If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily
[Bird]
|
6744
|
Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay?
[Bird]
|
6747
|
Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself
[Bird]
|
6748
|
Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them
[Bird]
|
6749
|
We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together
[Bird]
|
6745
|
A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong
[Bird]
|
6751
|
Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science
[Bird]
|
6762
|
Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations
[Bird]
|
6763
|
Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working
[Bird]
|
6753
|
Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes
[Bird]
|
6752
|
The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation
[Bird]
|
6754
|
We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things
[Bird]
|
6750
|
Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional
[Bird]
|
6761
|
Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another
[Bird]
|
6758
|
'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found
[Bird]
|
6759
|
Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts
[Bird]
|
6756
|
Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely
[Bird]
|
6760
|
An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death
[Bird]
|
6757
|
Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event
[Bird]
|
6764
|
Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name
[Bird]
|
6767
|
Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours
[Bird]
|
6773
|
If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind
[Bird]
|
6768
|
Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope
[Bird]
|
6771
|
Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another
[Bird]
|
6770
|
Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation
[Bird]
|
6776
|
Natural kinds are those that we use in induction
[Bird]
|
6769
|
In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6774
|
Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6766
|
Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition
[Bird]
|
6775
|
Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law
[Bird]
|
6772
|
Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter
[Bird]
|
6779
|
Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition
[Bird]
|
6785
|
Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist
[Bird]
|
6788
|
Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world
[Bird]
|
6787
|
Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth
[Bird]
|
6780
|
Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories
[Bird]
|
6778
|
Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant
[Bird]
|
6777
|
Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena
[Bird]
|
6786
|
As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases
[Bird]
|
6792
|
If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start?
[Bird]
|
6790
|
Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that
[Bird]
|
6791
|
If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge
[Bird]
|
6789
|
If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification
[Bird]
|
6798
|
Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works
[Bird]
|
6796
|
Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening
[Bird]
|
6797
|
Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it
[Bird]
|
6800
|
Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge
[Bird]
|
6799
|
We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds
[Bird]
|
6804
|
There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing
[Bird]
|
6801
|
Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual
[Bird]
|
6808
|
Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions
[Bird]
|
6802
|
With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity
[Bird]
|
6803
|
If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities.
[Bird]
|