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Single Idea 6780

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism ]

Full Idea

There is anti-realism with regard to unobservable entities and the theories that purport to mention them, but the more plausible version attaches to theories concerning what laws of nature are.

Gist of Idea

Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories

Source

Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.138

A Reaction

This sounds right. I certainly find anti-realism about the entities of science utterly implausible. I also doubt whether there is any such thing as a law, above and beyond the behaviour of matter. Theories float between the two.

The 61 ideas from 'Philosophy of Science'

6805 Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird]
6807 In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy [Bird]
6738 Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird]
6739 Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird]
6746 There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird]
6748 Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird]
6749 We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird]
6740 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird]
6741 There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird]
6742 A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird]
6743 If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird]
6744 Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird]
6747 Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird]
6745 A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird]
6756 Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird]
6760 An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird]
6751 Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird]
6753 Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird]
6762 Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird]
6763 Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird]
6752 The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird]
6750 Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird]
6758 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird]
6759 Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird]
6754 We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird]
6761 Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird]
6757 Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird]
6775 Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird]
6776 Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird]
6767 Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird]
6768 Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird]
6770 Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird]
6771 Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird]
6769 In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird]
6774 Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird]
6764 Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird]
6766 Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird]
6772 Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird]
6773 If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird]
6788 Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird]
6787 Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird]
6785 Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird]
6779 Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition [Bird]
6780 Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird]
6777 Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird]
6786 As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird]
6778 Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant [Bird]
6792 If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird]
6791 If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird]
6790 Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird]
6789 If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird]
6798 Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird]
6796 Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird]
6797 Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird]
6800 Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge [Bird]
6799 We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird]
6804 There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird]
6808 Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird]
6803 If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird]
6801 Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird]
6802 With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird]