more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
I propose that reference to scientific terms, such as natural kinds and theoretical terms, is not determined by a sense or description attached to the term, but by its explanatory role.
Gist of Idea
Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions
Source
Alexander Bird (Philosophy of Science [1998], Ch.8)
Book Ref
Bird,Alexander: 'Philosophy of Science' [UCL Press 2000], p.289
A Reaction
He gives the example of an electron, which had the same role in electrical theory, despite changes in understanding its nature. One might talk of its 'natural' (causal) role, rather than its 'explanatory' role (which implies a human viewpoint).
| 16782 | The names of all the types of creature were given forever by Adam [Anon (Tor)] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 2342 | "Water" is a natural kind term, but "H2O" is a description [Putnam] |
| 8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
| 4963 | The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke] |
| 17056 | Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke] |
| 18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |
| 15701 | Nouns seem to invoke stable kinds more than predicates do [Gelman] |
| 6764 | Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird] |
| 6766 | Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird] |
| 6808 | Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird] |
| 13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |