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Single Idea 6859
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
]
Full Idea
Certain advances in philosophical standards have been made within analytic philosophy, and there would be a serious loss of integrity involved in abandoning them in the way required to participate in current continental philosophy.
Gist of Idea
Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy
Source
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.151)
Book Ref
Baggini,J/Stangroom,J: 'New British Philosophy' [Routledge 2002], p.151
A Reaction
The reply might be to concede the point, but say that the precision and rigour achieved are precisely what debar analytical philosophy from thinking about the really interesting problems. One might as well switch to maths and have done with it.
The
96 ideas
from Timothy Williamson
6858
|
Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in
[Williamson]
|
6859
|
Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy
[Williamson]
|
6860
|
How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between?
[Williamson]
|
6861
|
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth?
[Williamson]
|
6862
|
Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions
[Williamson]
|
6863
|
Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge
[Williamson]
|
19512
|
Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology
[Williamson, by DeRose]
|
4760
|
Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing
[Williamson]
|
19526
|
Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances?
[Williamson]
|
19527
|
We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge
[Williamson]
|
19528
|
Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do
[Williamson]
|
19529
|
Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification
[Williamson]
|
19530
|
A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic
[Williamson]
|
19531
|
Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism
[Williamson]
|
19534
|
How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning?
[Williamson]
|
19535
|
Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate
[Williamson]
|
19533
|
Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references
[Williamson]
|
19532
|
Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items
[Williamson]
|
19536
|
Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge
[Williamson]
|
15130
|
If a property is possible, there is something which can have it
[Williamson]
|
14531
|
Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals
[Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
|
14625
|
Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation
[Williamson]
|
14623
|
Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B)
[Williamson]
|
14624
|
Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B)
[Williamson]
|
14626
|
In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent
[Williamson]
|
14628
|
Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals
[Williamson]
|
18925
|
If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey
[Williamson, by Cameron]
|
19216
|
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist
[Williamson]
|
16536
|
Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals
[Lowe on Williamson]
|
9592
|
Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence
[Williamson]
|
9593
|
Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama
[Williamson]
|
9594
|
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth
[Williamson]
|
9595
|
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it
[Williamson]
|
9596
|
We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals
[Williamson]
|
9597
|
There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved
[Williamson]
|
9598
|
Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking
[Williamson]
|
9599
|
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain
[Williamson]
|
9600
|
If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar
[Williamson]
|
9601
|
The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless
[Williamson]
|
9602
|
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness
[Williamson]
|
20181
|
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence
[Williamson]
|
9183
|
Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist
[Williamson]
|
9184
|
We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed
[Williamson]
|
15131
|
If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best
[Williamson]
|
15133
|
A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well
[Williamson]
|
15134
|
The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference
[Williamson]
|
15135
|
If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold
[Williamson]
|
15138
|
Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional
[Williamson]
|
15136
|
Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances
[Williamson]
|
15137
|
If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'?
[Williamson]
|
15139
|
Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition?
[Williamson]
|
15141
|
Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains
[Williamson]
|
15140
|
The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers
[Williamson]
|
15142
|
Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas
[Williamson]
|
18492
|
Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional
[Williamson]
|
21589
|
When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic
[Williamson]
|
21591
|
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which
[Williamson]
|
21590
|
Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness
[Williamson]
|
21592
|
Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics
[Williamson]
|
21596
|
Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic
[Williamson]
|
21599
|
A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites
[Williamson]
|
21600
|
'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect
[Williamson]
|
21601
|
A vague term can refer to very precise elements
[Williamson]
|
21602
|
Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored
[Williamson]
|
21603
|
You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague
[Williamson]
|
21604
|
Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected
[Williamson]
|
21607
|
Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided
[Williamson]
|
21606
|
'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false
[Williamson]
|
21605
|
Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language
[Williamson]
|
21611
|
Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model
[Williamson]
|
21612
|
Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B'
[Williamson]
|
21608
|
Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation
[Williamson]
|
21609
|
Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid'
[Williamson]
|
21610
|
Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic
[Williamson]
|
21613
|
Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness
[Williamson]
|
21614
|
The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept
[Williamson]
|
21615
|
References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful
[Williamson]
|
18038
|
The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false
[Williamson]
|
21617
|
We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition
[Williamson]
|
21616
|
Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions
[Williamson]
|
21618
|
If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say?
[Williamson]
|
21619
|
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is
[Williamson]
|
21620
|
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance
[Williamson]
|
21621
|
We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way
[Williamson]
|
21622
|
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use
[Williamson]
|
21623
|
True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation
[Williamson]
|
21624
|
It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds
[Williamson]
|
21625
|
The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed
[Williamson]
|
9120
|
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts
[Williamson]
|
21626
|
Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered
[Williamson]
|
21627
|
We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error
[Williamson]
|
21630
|
If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries?
[Williamson]
|
21629
|
Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness
[Williamson]
|
21632
|
A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries
[Williamson]
|
21633
|
Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different
[Williamson]
|
21631
|
To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them
[Williamson]
|