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Single Idea 6861

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects ]

Full Idea

The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?).

Gist of Idea

What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth?

Source

Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153)

Book Ref

Baggini,J/Stangroom,J: 'New British Philosophy' [Routledge 2002], p.153

A Reaction

This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't.

The 29 ideas with the same theme [distinct objects with uncertain boundaries]:

11853 A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus]
12986 The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
14798 All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
14797 Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
9891 The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
9388 Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
14484 If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
11852 Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
11875 Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
15536 We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
8982 Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
8984 If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
8985 Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
23545 We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
9769 Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
10275 A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro]
9045 Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
9047 Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
9053 If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
6861 What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
21630 If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
16220 Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
16222 Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
9132 An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
8944 Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
18839 An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
18838 The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
9389 Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]