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Full Idea
The problem of vagueness is the problem of what logic is correct for vague concepts, and correspondingly what notions of truth and falsity are applicable to vague statements (does one need a continuum of degrees of truth, for example?).
Gist of Idea
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth?
Source
Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.153)
Book Ref
Baggini,J/Stangroom,J: 'New British Philosophy' [Routledge 2002], p.153
A Reaction
This certainly makes vagueness sound like one of the most interesting problems in all of philosophy, though also one of the most difficult. Williamson's solution is that we may be vague, but the world isn't.
| 6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
| 6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
| 6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
| 6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
| 6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
| 6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |