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Single Idea 6863

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance ]

Full Idea

If one is very close to a conceptual boundary, then one's judgement will be too unreliable to constitute knowledge, and therefore one will be ignorant.

Gist of Idea

Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge

Source

Timothy Williamson (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.156)

Book Ref

Baggini,J/Stangroom,J: 'New British Philosophy' [Routledge 2002], p.156

A Reaction

This is the epistemological rather than ontological interpretation of vagueness. It sounds very persuasive, but I am reluctant to accept that reality is full of very precise boundaries which we cannot quite discriminate.

The 14 ideas with the same theme [vagueness arising from our imprecise knowledge]:

12516 Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke]
12517 Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke]
23542 Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
9044 If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
9048 The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
9055 The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
6863 Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson]
21591 Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
21619 If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
21620 The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
21622 If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
9120 Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
16226 Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
9116 Vague words have hidden boundaries [Sorensen]