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Single Idea 6872

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism ]

Full Idea

Even weak internalism has the problem of Forgotten Evidence; the agent once had adequate evidence that she subsequently forgot; at the time of epistemic appraisal, she no longer has adequate evidence that is retrievable from memory.

Gist of Idea

Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory

Source

Alvin I. Goldman (Internalism Exposed [1999], §3)

Book Ref

Goldman,Alvin I.: 'Pathways to Knowledge' [OUP 2002], p.10

A Reaction

This is certainly a basic problem for any account of justification. It will rule out any strict requirement that there be actual mental states available to support a belief. Internalism may be pushed to include non-conscious parts of the mind.

The 24 ideas with the same theme [reasons to favour internalist justifcation]:

604 Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle]
2087 A rational account might be seeing an image of one's belief, like a reflection in a mirror [Plato]
2090 A rational account involves giving an image, or analysis, or giving a differentiating mark [Plato]
4835 Anyone who knows, must know that they know, and even know that they know that they know.. [Spinoza]
8101 To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert]
21771 Consciousness derives its criterion of knowledge from direct knowledge of its own being [Hegel]
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
6871 We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman]
6872 Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman]
6874 Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman]
8830 A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman]
8814 Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
2749 For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J]
2770 Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J]
2739 Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
6373 Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
19708 Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid]
4724 Internalists say the reasons for belief must be available to the subject, and externalists deny this [O'Grady]
19498 Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
19682 Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew]
19705 'Mentalist' internalism seems to miss the main point, if it might not involve an agent's access [Vahid]
19706 Strong access internalism needs actual awareness; weak versions need possibility of access [Vahid]
19707 Maybe we need access to our justification, and also to know why it justifies [Vahid]