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Single Idea 6884

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals ]

Full Idea

A counterfactual conditional (or 'counterfactual') is a proposition or sentence of the form 'If it had been the case that p, then it would have been the case that q', or 'If it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q'.

Gist of Idea

Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q'

Source

Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.114)

Book Ref

Mautner,Thomas: 'Dictionary of Philosophy' [Penguin 1997], p.114


A Reaction

The first statement refers to the past, but the second (a subjunctive) refers to any situation at any time. We know more about inferences that we could have made in the past than we do about what is inferable at absolutely any time.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [facts in worlds different from the actual world]:

It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
Counterfactuals are just right for analysing statements about the powers which things have [Harré/Madden]
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis]
In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich]
Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis]
Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich]
Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson]
A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
Counterfactuals aren't about actuality, so they lack truthmakers or a supervenience base [Merricks]
Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber]
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]