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Single Idea 6938

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution ]

Full Idea

It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought.

Gist of Idea

Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.8

A Reaction

Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin.

The 15 ideas from 'The Fixation of Belief'

21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]