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Single Idea 6941
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
]
Full Idea
As soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false.
Gist of Idea
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.10)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.10
A Reaction
This does not deny that the truth or falsehood of a belief is independent of whether we are satisfied with it. It is making a fair point, though, about why we believe things, and it can't be because of truth, because we don't know how to ensure that.
The
15 ideas
from 'The Fixation of Belief'
21492
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Realism is basic to the scientific method
[Peirce]
|
6598
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We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency
[Peirce]
|
6937
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Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known
[Peirce]
|
6939
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What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass)
[Peirce]
|
6938
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Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones
[Peirce]
|
6940
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The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
[Peirce]
|
6941
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We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
[Peirce]
|
6942
|
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
[Peirce]
|
6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
[Peirce]
|
6943
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A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
[Peirce]
|
6945
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Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue
[Peirce]
|
6946
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If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment
[Peirce]
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6947
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Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe
[Peirce]
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6948
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Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
[Peirce]
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6949
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If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction
[Peirce]
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