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Single Idea 6942
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
]
Full Idea
We seek for a belief that we shall think to be true; but we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere tautology to say so.
Clarification
It is a tautology if it is implied in the definition
Gist of Idea
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.11
A Reaction
If, as I do, you like to define belief as 'commitment to truth', Peirce makes a rather startling observation. You are rendered unable to ask whether your beliefs are true, because you have defined them as true. Nice point…
The
25 ideas
with the same theme
[the purpose or aim of beliefs]:
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2050
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It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false
[Plato]
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4391
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Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth
[Aristotle]
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1685
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No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true
[Aristotle]
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14050
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We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes
[Epicurus]
|
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9100
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Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true
[William of Ockham]
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6940
|
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
[Peirce]
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6941
|
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
[Peirce]
|
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6942
|
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
[Peirce]
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6943
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A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
[Peirce]
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14781
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A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed
[Peirce]
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19223
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We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
[Peirce]
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4485
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Every belief is a considering-something-true
[Nietzsche]
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6672
|
Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false'
[Moore,GE, by Lowe]
|
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3212
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Beliefs are maps by which we steer
[Ramsey]
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6600
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The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns
[Wittgenstein]
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3816
|
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
|
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3833
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A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
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3837
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We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
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19308
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We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it
[Harman]
|
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3570
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Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth
[Nozick, by Williams,M]
|
|
6783
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To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate
[Fraassen, by Bird]
|
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4760
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Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing
[Williamson]
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4754
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Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires
[Engel]
|
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19525
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If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right)
[Conee/Feldman]
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15372
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Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true
[Horsten]
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