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Single Idea 6943

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs ]

Full Idea

The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief; there must be a real and living doubt.

Gist of Idea

A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.11


A Reaction

This the attractive aspect of Peirce's pragmatism, that he is always focusing on real life rather than abstract theory or pure logic.


The 15 ideas from 'The Fixation of Belief'

Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]