more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 6944

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs ]

Full Idea

It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt.

Gist of Idea

Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.11

A Reaction

Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind.

The 15 ideas with the same theme [contents and origin of foundational beliefs]:

1670 When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle]
20795 Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus]
5004 We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
23245 Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte]
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
4257 The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour]
2756 If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
8896 Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour]
8853 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
3580 Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M]
6353 People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
6361 Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
4582 Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
8845 An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]