more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 6944

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs ]

Full Idea

It is a common idea that demonstration must rest on indubitable propositions, either first principles of a general nature, or first sensations; but actual demonstration is completely satisfactory if it starts from propositions free from all actual doubt.

Gist of Idea

Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.11

A Reaction

Another nice example of Peirce focusing on the practical business of thinking, rather than abstract theory. I agree with this approach, that explanation and proof do not aim at perfection and indubitability, but at what satisfies a critical mind.

The 15 ideas from 'The Fixation of Belief'

21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]