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Single Idea 6945

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique ]

Full Idea

Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.

Gist of Idea

Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue

Source

Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)

Book Ref

Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.11

A Reaction

This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical.

The 15 ideas from 'The Fixation of Belief'

21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce]
6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce]
6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce]
6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce]
6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce]
6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce]
6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce]
6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce]
6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce]
6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce]
6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce]