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Single Idea 6945
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
]
Full Idea
Some people seem to love to argue a point after all the world is fully convinced of it. But no further advance can be made. When doubt ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without purpose.
Gist of Idea
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue
Source
Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.11)
Book Ref
Peirce,Charles Sanders: 'Philosophical Writings of Peirce', ed/tr. Buchler,Justus [Dover 1940], p.11
A Reaction
This is the way Peirce's pragmatism, which deals with how real thinking actually works (rather than abstract logic), deals with scepticism. However, there is a borderline where almost everyone is satisfied, but the very wise person remains sceptical.
The
15 ideas
from 'The Fixation of Belief'
21492
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Realism is basic to the scientific method
[Peirce]
|
6598
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We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency
[Peirce]
|
6937
|
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known
[Peirce]
|
6939
|
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass)
[Peirce]
|
6938
|
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones
[Peirce]
|
6940
|
The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
[Peirce]
|
6941
|
We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
[Peirce]
|
6942
|
We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
[Peirce]
|
6943
|
A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
[Peirce]
|
6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
[Peirce]
|
6945
|
Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue
[Peirce]
|
6946
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If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment
[Peirce]
|
6947
|
Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe
[Peirce]
|
6948
|
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
[Peirce]
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6949
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If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction
[Peirce]
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