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Full Idea
I suspect that the experiences which some philosophers want to describe as intuitions, or a quasi-sensory apprehensions, of good are not significantly different from those that I want to describe as feelings of approval.
Gist of Idea
I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval
Source
A.J. Ayer (On the analysis of moral judgements [1949], p.239)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'Philosophical Essays' [Macmillan 1965], p.239
A Reaction
This is the standard ground for rejecting intuitionism, along with the point that even if intuitions are not just feelings of approval, it seems impossible to tell the difference.
6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |