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Single Idea 6984
[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
]
Full Idea
In a 'smooth' reduction the laws of the reduced theory (thermodynamics of gases) are pretty much preserved in (and isomorphic with) the corresponding laws in the reducing theory (molecular or kinetic theory of gases).
Clarification
'Isomorphic' means maps onto
Gist of Idea
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level
Source
Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Jackson,Frank: 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' [OUP 2000], p.57
A Reaction
Are the 'laws' of weather (e.g. linking humidity, temperature and pressure to rainfall) preserved at the level of physics? One might say that they are not preserved, but they are not lost either (they just fade away). Contradictions would be worrying.
The
27 ideas
from 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'
6979
|
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences
[Jackson]
|
7005
|
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account
[Jackson]
|
6977
|
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
[Jackson]
|
6975
|
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties
[Jackson]
|
6976
|
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around
[Jackson]
|
6982
|
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible
[Jackson]
|
6980
|
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story
[Jackson]
|
6984
|
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level
[Jackson]
|
6991
|
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect
[Jackson]
|
6986
|
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori?
[Jackson]
|
6987
|
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity
[Jackson]
|
6990
|
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water'
[Jackson]
|
6985
|
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases
[Jackson]
|
6989
|
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions
[Jackson]
|
6983
|
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis
[Jackson]
|
6988
|
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework
[Jackson]
|
6993
|
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans
[Jackson]
|
6992
|
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible
[Jackson]
|
6996
|
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output
[Jackson]
|
6994
|
Truth supervenes on being
[Jackson]
|
6997
|
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality
[Jackson]
|
7000
|
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.?
[Jackson]
|
6999
|
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide
[Jackson]
|
6998
|
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing
[Jackson]
|
6995
|
Successful predication supervenes on nature
[Jackson]
|
6978
|
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter
[Jackson]
|
14707
|
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings
[Jackson, by Schroeter]
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