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Single Idea 6986

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind ]

Full Idea

Should the necessary passage from the physical account of the world to the psychological one that physicalists are committed to, be placed in the a posteriori or the a priori basket?

Gist of Idea

Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori?

Source

Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Jackson,Frank: 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' [OUP 2000], p.68


A Reaction

That is, is 'the physical entails the mental' empirical or a priori? See Idea 3989. If we can at least dream of substance dualism, it is hard to see how it could be fully a priori. I think I prefer to see it as an inductive explanation.

Related Idea

Idea 3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]


The 27 ideas from 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'

Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]