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Single Idea 6989
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
]
Full Idea
If I hear someone say "He has a beard", and I don't know whether it is Jackson, Jones, or someone else, I don't know which proposition is being expressed in the sense of not knowing the conditions under which what is said is true.
Gist of Idea
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions
Source
Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Jackson,Frank: 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' [OUP 2000], p.73
A Reaction
This is the neatest and simplest problem I have encountered for Davidson's truth-conditions account of meaning. However, we probably just say that we understand the sense but not the reference. The strict-and-literal but not contextual meaning.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[giving meaning by specifying how sentences would be true]:
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7767
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The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions
[Russell, by Lycan]
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8189
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Truth-condition theorists must argue use can only be described by appeal to conditions of truth
[Dummett]
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8191
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The truth-conditions theory must get agreement on a conception of truth
[Dummett]
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2559
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Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences
[Rorty]
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19132
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Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
[Davidson]
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11076
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Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics
[Kripke, by Hanna]
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6989
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I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions
[Jackson]
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3079
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Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions
[Harman]
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16401
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To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true
[Stalnaker]
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2459
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Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is
[Fodor]
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13964
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Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances)
[Soames]
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2547
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There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood
[McGinn]
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7770
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Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate'
[Lycan]
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18997
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Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal
[Yablo]
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7323
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If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax
[Miller,A]
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