more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 6991

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception ]

Full Idea

We examine objects to determine their colour; we do not introspect.

Gist of Idea

We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect

Source

Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Jackson,Frank: 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' [OUP 2000], p.89


A Reaction

Interesting, but the theory of secondary qualities did not arise from experience, but from a theory about what is actually going on. Compare pain appearing to be in your foot.


The 27 ideas from 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'

Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]