more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 7002

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds ]

Full Idea

When pressed, philosophers will describe propositions as states of affairs or sets of possible worlds. But wait! Neither sets of possible worlds nor states of affairs - electrons being negatively charged, for instance - have truth values.

Gist of Idea

If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values

Source

John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], Intro)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.10

A Reaction

I'm not sure that I see a problem. A pure proposition, expressed as, say "there is a giraffe on the roof" only acquires a truth value at the point where you assert it or believe it. There IS a possible world where there is a giraffe on the roof.

The 54 ideas from 'From an Ontological Point of View'

7001 If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil]
7004 The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil]
7003 There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil]
7007 I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil]
7009 Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil]
7008 Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil]
7011 Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil]
7010 Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil]
7002 If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil]
7012 If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil]
7013 The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil]
7015 A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil]
7018 Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil]
7017 The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil]
7016 The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil]
7019 Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil]
7020 Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil]
7021 If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil]
7023 Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
7025 Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
7026 Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil]
7027 Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
7028 If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil]
7029 Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil]
7030 Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil]
7032 Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
7034 Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil]
7036 The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil]
7035 God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil]
7038 A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil]
7037 Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil]
7039 How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil]
7044 Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil]
7045 Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil]
7041 Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil]
7042 A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil]
7043 Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
7046 Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
7047 Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil]
7048 Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil]
7051 Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil]
7052 Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil]
7053 Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil]
7054 Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil]
7057 Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil]
7058 Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil]
7060 One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil]
7059 The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil]
7061 Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
7062 Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil]
7063 Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
7064 Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]
7066 If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil]
7065 Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil]