more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Properties of conscious experience, the so-called qualia, are not dangling appendages to material states and processes but intrinsic ingredients of those states and processes.
Gist of Idea
Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes
Source
John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], Intro)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.14
A Reaction
Personally I am inclined to the view that qualia are intrinsic to the processes and NOT to the 'states'. Heil must be right, though. I am sure qualia are not just epiphenomena - they are too useful.
| 12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
| 7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
| 7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
| 2582 | A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block] |
| 7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
| 7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
| 3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
| 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
| 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 4935 | The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi] |