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Single Idea 7022

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence ]

Full Idea

A thing really is if it has any capacity, either by nature to do something to something else or to have even the smallest thing done to it by the most trivial thing, even if it only happens once. I'll define those which are as nothing other than capacity.

Gist of Idea

To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions

Source

Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 247e)

Book Ref

Plato: 'Complete Works', ed/tr. Cooper,John M. [Hackett 1997], p.269

A Reaction

If philosophy is footnotes to Plato, this should be the foundational remark in all discussions of existence (though Parmenides might claim priority). It seems to say 'to be is to have a causal role (active or passive)'. It also seems essentialist.

Related Idea

Idea 2329 Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]

The 16 ideas from 'The Sophist'

1636 Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato]
1637 A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato]
1638 Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato]
20478 In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato]
11278 What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato]
1641 Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato]
7022 To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato]
1642 We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato]
1643 If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato]
287 Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato]
16122 Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato]
1644 Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato]
10422 The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato]
15855 If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato]
1645 The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato]
10784 Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato]