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Single Idea 7026
[filed under theme 14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
]
Full Idea
The sciences are sometimes said to be in the business of identifying and classifying powers; the mass of an electron, its spin and charge, could be regarded as powers possessed by the electron; science is silent on an electron's qualities.
Gist of Idea
Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities
Source
John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 11.2)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.114
A Reaction
Heil raises the possibility that qualities are real, despite the silence of science; he wants colour to be a real quality. I like the simpler version of science. Qualities are the mental effects of powers; there exist substances, powers and effects.
The
54 ideas
from 'From an Ontological Point of View'
7001
|
If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it
[Heil]
|
7004
|
The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading
[Heil]
|
7003
|
There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality
[Heil]
|
7007
|
I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative
[Heil]
|
7009
|
Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
[Heil]
|
7008
|
Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes
[Heil]
|
7010
|
Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality
[Heil]
|
7011
|
Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes
[Heil]
|
7002
|
If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values
[Heil]
|
7012
|
If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything?
[Heil]
|
7013
|
The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it
[Heil]
|
7015
|
A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects
[Heil]
|
7018
|
Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties
[Heil]
|
7017
|
The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality
[Heil]
|
7016
|
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events
[Heil]
|
7019
|
Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field
[Heil]
|
7020
|
Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions
[Heil]
|
7021
|
If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent
[Heil]
|
7023
|
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities
[Heil]
|
7025
|
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added?
[Heil]
|
7026
|
Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities
[Heil]
|
7027
|
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
[Heil]
|
7028
|
If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable
[Heil]
|
7029
|
Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property?
[Heil]
|
7030
|
Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property
[Heil]
|
7032
|
Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership
[Heil]
|
7034
|
Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour
[Heil]
|
7036
|
The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties
[Heil]
|
7035
|
God does not create the world, and then add the classes
[Heil]
|
7037
|
Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be
[Heil]
|
7038
|
A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities
[Heil]
|
7039
|
How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances?
[Heil]
|
7044
|
Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us
[Heil]
|
7045
|
Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints'
[Heil]
|
7041
|
Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
[Heil]
|
7042
|
A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
[Heil]
|
7043
|
Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties
[Heil]
|
7046
|
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties
[Heil]
|
7047
|
Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical
[Heil]
|
7048
|
Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze?
[Heil]
|
7051
|
Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities
[Heil]
|
7052
|
Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky
[Heil]
|
7053
|
Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red
[Heil]
|
7054
|
Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views
[Heil]
|
7057
|
Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism
[Heil]
|
7058
|
Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological
[Heil]
|
7060
|
One form of explanation is by decomposition
[Heil]
|
7059
|
The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts
[Heil]
|
7061
|
Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world
[Heil]
|
7062
|
Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
[Heil]
|
7063
|
Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical
[Heil]
|
7064
|
Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state
[Heil]
|
7066
|
If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs?
[Heil]
|
7065
|
Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language
[Heil]
|