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Single Idea 7027
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
]
Full Idea
A central tenet of functionalism is that objects can be dispositionally indiscernible but differ qualitatively as much as you please.
Clarification
A 'tenet' is a basic opinion
Gist of Idea
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
Source
John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 11.3)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.115
A Reaction
This refers to the multiple realisability of functions. Presumably we reconcile essentialism with the functionalist view by saying that dispositions result from combinations of qualities. A unique combination of qualities will necessitate a disposition.
The
141 ideas
from John Heil
7001
|
If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it
[Heil]
|
7004
|
The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading
[Heil]
|
7003
|
There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality
[Heil]
|
7007
|
I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative
[Heil]
|
7008
|
Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes
[Heil]
|
7009
|
Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
[Heil]
|
7010
|
Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality
[Heil]
|
7011
|
Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes
[Heil]
|
7002
|
If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values
[Heil]
|
7012
|
If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything?
[Heil]
|
7013
|
The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it
[Heil]
|
7015
|
A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects
[Heil]
|
7018
|
Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties
[Heil]
|
7017
|
The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality
[Heil]
|
7016
|
The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events
[Heil]
|
7019
|
Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field
[Heil]
|
7020
|
Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions
[Heil]
|
7021
|
If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent
[Heil]
|
7023
|
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities
[Heil]
|
7025
|
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added?
[Heil]
|
7026
|
Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities
[Heil]
|
7027
|
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality
[Heil]
|
7028
|
If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable
[Heil]
|
7029
|
Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property?
[Heil]
|
7030
|
Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property
[Heil]
|
7032
|
Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership
[Heil]
|
7034
|
Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour
[Heil]
|
7036
|
The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties
[Heil]
|
7035
|
God does not create the world, and then add the classes
[Heil]
|
7037
|
Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be
[Heil]
|
7038
|
A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities
[Heil]
|
7039
|
How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances?
[Heil]
|
7044
|
Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us
[Heil]
|
7045
|
Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints'
[Heil]
|
7041
|
Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
[Heil]
|
7042
|
A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
[Heil]
|
7043
|
Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties
[Heil]
|
7046
|
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties
[Heil]
|
7047
|
Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical
[Heil]
|
7048
|
Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze?
[Heil]
|
7051
|
Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities
[Heil]
|
7052
|
Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky
[Heil]
|
7053
|
Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red
[Heil]
|
7054
|
Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views
[Heil]
|
7057
|
Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism
[Heil]
|
7058
|
Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological
[Heil]
|
7060
|
One form of explanation is by decomposition
[Heil]
|
7059
|
The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts
[Heil]
|
7061
|
Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world
[Heil]
|
7062
|
Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
[Heil]
|
7063
|
Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical
[Heil]
|
7064
|
Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state
[Heil]
|
7066
|
If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs?
[Heil]
|
7065
|
Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language
[Heil]
|
4588
|
There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences
[Heil]
|
4587
|
From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property
[Heil]
|
4586
|
You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology
[Heil]
|
4592
|
If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat
[Heil]
|
4591
|
Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality
[Heil]
|
4590
|
If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem
[Heil]
|
4593
|
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties
[Heil]
|
4596
|
The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem
[Heil]
|
4594
|
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one
[Heil]
|
4595
|
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene
[Heil]
|
4597
|
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties
[Heil]
|
4603
|
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
[Heil]
|
4599
|
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property
[Heil]
|
4601
|
Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels
[Heil]
|
4602
|
Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels
[Heil]
|
4598
|
Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them
[Heil]
|
4609
|
It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs
[Heil]
|
4605
|
Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning'
[Heil]
|
4606
|
To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble'
[Heil]
|
4604
|
If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them?
[Heil]
|
4607
|
Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are
[Heil]
|
4617
|
A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone
[Heil]
|
4612
|
Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate
[Heil]
|
4625
|
Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional?
[Heil]
|
4615
|
Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties
[Heil]
|
4611
|
The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties
[Heil]
|
4616
|
A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws
[Heil]
|
4619
|
'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised
[Heil]
|
4620
|
Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things
[Heil]
|
4624
|
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
[Heil]
|
4614
|
Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions
[Heil]
|
4610
|
Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
[Heil]
|
4618
|
If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind
[Heil]
|
4621
|
Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
[Heil]
|
4623
|
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery
[Heil]
|
4626
|
The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world
[Heil]
|
4622
|
Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements
[Heil]
|
21339
|
We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them
[Heil]
|
21351
|
Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation
[Heil]
|
21350
|
If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations
[Heil]
|
21344
|
If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R
[Heil]
|
21348
|
In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers
[Heil]
|
21349
|
Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties
[Heil]
|
21340
|
Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations
[Heil]
|
18495
|
The best philosophers I know are the best people I know
[Heil]
|
18494
|
Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions
[Heil]
|
18505
|
Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory
[Heil]
|
18504
|
Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation
[Heil]
|
18506
|
Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics
[Heil]
|
18507
|
Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances
[Heil]
|
18508
|
Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist
[Heil]
|
18509
|
Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true
[Heil]
|
18511
|
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have
[Heil]
|
18510
|
We need properties to explain how the world works
[Heil]
|
18512
|
Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being
[Heil]
|
18513
|
Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them
[Heil]
|
18515
|
Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts
[Heil]
|
18514
|
Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts
[Heil]
|
18516
|
A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all
[Heil]
|
18517
|
Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line
[Heil]
|
18518
|
Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers
[Heil]
|
18519
|
If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy
[Heil]
|
18520
|
Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations
[Heil]
|
18522
|
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties
[Heil]
|
18523
|
Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers?
[Heil]
|
18524
|
Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities
[Heil]
|
18525
|
Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent
[Heil]
|
18526
|
We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences
[Heil]
|
18527
|
Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause
[Heil]
|
18531
|
Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted
[Heil]
|
18532
|
If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations
[Heil]
|
18533
|
In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate
[Heil]
|
18534
|
Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18498
|
Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18497
|
Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements
[Heil]
|
18496
|
If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements
[Heil]
|
18500
|
How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers
[Heil]
|
18499
|
Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter
[Heil]
|
18502
|
If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities
[Heil]
|
18501
|
Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature?
[Heil]
|
18503
|
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are
[Heil]
|
18535
|
Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically
[Heil]
|
18536
|
The subject-predicate form reflects reality
[Heil]
|
18538
|
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought
[Heil]
|
18537
|
Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought
[Heil]
|
18539
|
Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction
[Heil]
|
18540
|
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals
[Heil]
|