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Single Idea 7041
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
]
Full Idea
Objects are similar by virtue of possessing similar properties; properties, in contrast, are not similar in virtue of anything.
Gist of Idea
Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
Source
John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 14.2)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.152
A Reaction
I am not sure if I can understand the concept of similarity if there is no answer to the question 'In what respect?' I suppose David Hume is happy to take resemblance as given and basic, but it could be defined as 'sharing identical properties'.
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[universals are groups of resembling particulars]:
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5015
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A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another
[Descartes]
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6714
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Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
[Berkeley]
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11098
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Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance
[Hume, by Quine]
|
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7954
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If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences
[Hume]
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23649
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No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white
[Reid]
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4441
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'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal
[Russell]
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7956
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If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance
[Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
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7957
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Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together
[Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
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8532
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Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
[Armstrong]
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4439
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'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
[Armstrong]
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4440
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'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
[Armstrong]
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8500
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Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned
[Jackson]
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8521
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Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
[Campbell,K]
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7009
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Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
[Heil]
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7041
|
Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
[Heil]
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7720
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Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal
[Lowe]
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9447
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If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees
[Mumford]
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4458
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Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
[Moreland]
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9472
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Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common
[Bird]
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7955
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Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances
[Macdonald,C]
|
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18435
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Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round)
[Rodriquez-Pereyra]
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18436
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Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed
[Rodriquez-Pereyra]
|
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18437
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Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson'
[Edwards]
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