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Single Idea 7042
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
]
Full Idea
The friend of universals has an account of similarity relations as relations of identity and partial identity; the friend of modes must regard similarity relations as primitive and irreducible.
Clarification
'Modes' is Heil's term for the more usual 'tropes'
Gist of Idea
A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
Source
John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 14.5)
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.157
A Reaction
We always seem to be able to ask 'in what respect' a similarity occurs. If similarity is 'primitive and irreducible', we should not be able to analyse and explain a similarity, yet we seem able to. I conclude that Heil is wrong.
The
36 ideas
with the same theme
[the principles and concepts of trope theory]:
8511
|
Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars
[Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
|
8508
|
A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence
[Williams,DC]
|
8509
|
A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections
[Williams,DC]
|
8510
|
'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set
[Williams,DC]
|
15483
|
Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor
[Martin,CB]
|
8537
|
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
[Armstrong]
|
18373
|
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
[Armstrong]
|
4444
|
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
[Armstrong]
|
9657
|
You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it
[Lewis]
|
15433
|
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
[Lewis]
|
8513
|
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue
[Campbell,K]
|
8514
|
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars
[Campbell,K]
|
8522
|
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars
[Campbell,K]
|
8523
|
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect
[Campbell,K]
|
8524
|
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size
[Campbell,K]
|
11928
|
Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism
[Molnar]
|
8526
|
We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes
[Daly]
|
10738
|
Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice
[Oliver]
|
10740
|
The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes
[Oliver]
|
10741
|
Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars
[Oliver]
|
10739
|
The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness
[Oliver]
|
7042
|
A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive
[Heil]
|
10464
|
A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality)
[Bacon,John]
|
10465
|
Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category
[Bacon,John]
|
10467
|
Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes
[Bacon,John]
|
8285
|
I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence
[Lowe]
|
4234
|
Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere
[Lowe]
|
4235
|
Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness
[Lowe]
|
4236
|
Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles
[Lowe]
|
4461
|
Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal
[Moreland]
|
18431
|
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes
[Simons, by Edwards]
|
14605
|
Tropes are the same as events
[Schaffer,J]
|
7934
|
Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations)
[Macdonald,C]
|
7958
|
Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars
[Macdonald,C]
|
7972
|
Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist
[Macdonald,C]
|
18864
|
The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property
[Tallant]
|